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 The classic structure-conduct-performance approach to industrial organization 
centers on three questions. First, why is does an industry look the way it does, in terms 
of numbers of competitors, market share distribution and various other metrics? 
Second, how do firms actually compete, in terms the formation of prices, product and 
service quality, rivalry and collaboration within and across strategic groups, and other 
attributes of economic behavior? And third, how does the industry perform for its 
shareholders, its employees, its clients and suppliers, and within the context the system 
as a whole in terms of its impact on income and growth, stability, and possibly less 
clearly defined ideas about such things as social equity? In the financial services 
industry, these same questions have attracted more than the normal degree of 
attention. The industry is “special” in a variety of ways, including the fiduciary nature of 
the business, its role at the center of the payments and capital allocation process with 
all its static and dynamic implications for economic performance, and the systemic 
nature of problems that can arise in the industry. So the structure, conduct and 
performance of the industry has unusually important public interest dimensions.  
 One facet of the discussion has focused on size of financial firms, however 
measured, and the range of activities conducted by them. Exhibit 1 depicts a taxonomy 
of broad-gauge financial services businesses. What are the strategic opportunities and 
competitive consequences of deepening and broadening a firm’s business within and 
between the four sectors and eight sub-sectors? Is size positively related to total returns  
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to shareholders? If so, does this involve gains in efficiency or transfers of wealth to  
shareholders from other constituencies, or maybe both? Does greater breadth generate  
sufficient information-cost and transaction-cost economies to be beneficial to 
shareholders and customers, or can it work against their interests in ways that may 
ultimately impede shareholder value as well? And what about the “specialness,” notably 
the industry’s fiduciary character and systemic risk -- is bigger and broader also safer?  
 This paper begins with a simple strategic framework for thinking about these 
issues from the perspective of the management of financial firms. What should they be 
trying to do, and how does this relate to the issues of size and breadth? It then reviews 
the available evidence and reaches a set of tentative conclusions from what we know so 
far, both from a shareholder perspective and that of the financial system as a whole. 
 
A Simple Strategic Schematic 
 Exhibit 2 is a depiction of the market for financial services as a matrix of clients, 
products and geographies. [Walter, 1988] Financial firms clearly will want to allocate 
available financial, human and technological resources to those cells (market segments) 
in the matrix that promise to throw-off the highest risk-adjusted returns.1 In order to do 
this, they will have to appropriately attribute costs, returns and risks to specific cells in 
the matrix. And the cells themselves have to be linked-together in a way that maximizes 
what practitioners and analysts commonly call “synergies.” 
● Client-driven linkages exist when a financial institution serving a particular client 
or client-group can, as a result, supply financial services either to the same client 
or to another client in the same group more efficiently in the same or different 
geographies. Risk-mitigation results from spreading exposures across clients, 
along with greater earnings stability to the extent that income streams from 
different clients or client-segments are not perfectly correlated. 
 
● Product-driven linkages exist when an institution can supply a particular financial 
service in a more competitive manner because it is already producing the same 
or a similar financial service in different client or arena dimensions. Here again, 
there is risk mitigation to the extent that net revenue streams from different 
products are not perfectly correlated. 
                                                 
1 Much of the following discussion relies on Walter [2003]. 
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● Geographic linkages are important when an institution can service a particular 
client or supply a particular service more efficiently in one geography as a result 
of having an active presence in another geography. Once more, the risk profile of 
the firm may be improved to the extent that business is spread across different 
currencies, macroeconomic and interest-rate environments. 
 
 To extract maximum returns from the market matrix, firms need to understand 
the competitive dynamics of specific segments as well as, the costs – including 
acquisition and integration costs in the case of M&A initiatives – and the risks imbedded 
in the overall portfolio of activities. Especially challenging is the task of optimizing the 
linkages between the cells to maximize potential joint cost and revenue economies, as 
discussed below. Firms that do this well can be considered to have a high degree of 
“strategic integrity” and should have a market capitalization that exceeds their stand-
alone value of their constituent businesses. 
 So is bigger and broader better in the financial services industry? If so, why? And 
what is the evidence? Here we shall consider each of the major arguments, pro and 
con. 
 
Economies and Diseconomies of Scale  
 Whether economies or diseconomies of scale exist in financial services has been 
at the heart of strategic and regulatory discussions about optimum firm size in the 
financial services industry. Are larger firms associated with increased scale economies 
and hence profitability and shareholder value? Can increased average size of firms 
create a more efficient financial sector? Answers are not easy to find, because they 
have to isolate the impact of pure size of the production unit as a whole from all of the 
other revenue and cost impacts of size, discussed below. 
 In an information- and transactions-intensive industry with frequently high fixed 
costs such as financial services, there should be ample potential for scale economies. 
However, the potential for diseconomies of scale attributable to disproportionate 
increases in administrative overhead, management of complexity, agency problems and 
other cost factors could also occur in very large financial services firms.  If economies of 
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scale prevail, increased size will help create financial efficiency and shareholder value. 
If diseconomies prevail, both will be destroyed.  Scale-effects should be directly 
observable in cost functions of financial services firms and in aggregate performance 
measures.   
Many studies of economies of scale have been undertaken in the banking, 
insurance and securities industries over the years -- see Saunders [2000] for a survey. 
Unfortunately, examinations of both scale and scope economies in financial services 
are unusually problematic. The nature of the empirical tests used, the form of the cost 
functions, the existence of unique optimum output levels, and the optimizing behavior of 
financial firms all present difficulties. Limited availability and conformity of data present 
serious empirical issues. And the conclusions of any study that has detected (or failed 
to detect) economies of scale and/or scope in a sample of financial institutions does not 
necessarily have general applicability. Nevertheless, the impact on the operating 
economics (production functions) of financial firms is so important that available 
empirical evidence is central to the whole argument. 
 Estimated cost functions form the basis most of the available empirical tests.  
Virtually all of them have found that economies of scale are achieved with increases in 
size among small commercial banks (below $100 million in asset size). A few studies 
have shown that scale economies may also exist in banks falling into the $100 million to 
$5 billion range. There is very little evidence so far of scale economies in the case of 
banks larger than $5 billion. More recently, there is some scattered evidence of scale-
related cost gains for banks up to $25 billion in asset size. [Berger and Mester, 1997] 
But according to a survey of all empirical studies of economies of scale through 1998, 
there was no evidence of such economies among very large banks. Berger, Demsetz 
and Strahan [1998] and Berger, Hunter, and Timme [1993] found the relationship 
between size and average cost to be U-shaped. This suggests that small banks can 
benefit from economies of scale, but that large banks seem to suffer from diseconomies 
of scale, resulting in higher average costs as they increase in size. The consensus 
seems to be that scale economies and diseconomies generally do not result in more 
than about 5% difference in unit costs. Inability to find major economies of scale among 
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large financial services firms is also true of insurance companies [Cummins and Zi, 
1998] and broker-dealers [Goldberg, Hanweck, Keenan and Young, 1991]. Lang and 
Wetzel [1998] found diseconomies of scale in both banking and securities services 
among German universal banks. 
 Except for the very smallest among banks and nonbank financial firms, scale 
economies seem likely to have relatively little bearing on competitive performance. This 
is particularly true since smaller institutions are sometimes linked-together in 
cooperatives or other structures that allow harvesting available economies of scale 
centrally, or are specialists in specific market-segments in Exhibit 2 that are not 
particularly sensitive to relatively small cost differences that seem to be associated with 
economies of scale in the financial services industry. A basic problem is that most of the 
available empirical studies focus entirely on firm-wide scale economies when the really 
important scale issues are encountered at the level of individual businesses.  
There is ample evidence, for example, that economies of scale are significant for 
operating economies and competitive performance in areas such as global custody, 
processing of mass-market credit card transactions and institutional asset management.  
Economies of scale may be far less important in other areas such as private banking 
and M&A advisory services.  Unfortunately, empirical data on cost functions that would 
permit identification of economies of scale at the product level are generally proprietary, 
and therefore unavailable. Disturbingly, it seems reasonable that a scale-driven strategy 
may make a great deal of sense in specific areas of financial activity even in the 
absence of evidence that there is very much to be gained at the firm-wide level. Still, the 
notion that there are some lines of activity that clearly benefit from scale economies 
while at the same time observations of firm-wide economies of scale are empirically 
elusive, suggests that there must be numerous lines of activity (or combinations) where 
diseconomies of scale exist. 
 
Cost Economies of Scope 
 Beyond pure scale-effects, are there cost reductions to be achieved by selling a 
broader rather than narrower range of products? Cost economies of scope mean that 
  6 
the joint production of two or more products or services is accomplished more cheaply 
than producing them separately.  “Global” scope economies become evident on the cost 
side when the total cost of producing all products is less than producing them 
individually, while “activity-specific” economies consider the joint production of particular 
pairs or clusters of financial services. Cost economies of scope can be harvested 
through the sharing of IT platforms and other overheads, information and monitoring 
costs, and the like. Information, for example, can be reused and thereby avoid cost 
duplication, facilitate creativity in developing solutions to client problems, and leverage 
client-specific knowledge. [Stefanadis, 2002]. On the other hand, cost diseconomies of 
scope may arise from such factors as inertia and lack of responsiveness and creativity 
that may come with increased firm breadth, complexity and bureaucratization, as well as 
"turf" and profit-attribution conflicts that increase costs or erode product quality in 
meeting client needs, or serious cultural differences across the organizational “silos” 
that inhibit seamless delivery of a broad range of financial services.  
 Like economies of scale, cost-related scope economies should be directly 
observable in cost functions of financial services suppliers and in aggregate 
performance measures. Most empirical studies have failed to find significant cost-
economies of scope in the banking, insurance or securities industries [Saunders 2000]. 
They suggest that some cost-diseconomies of scope are encountered when firms in the 
financial services sector add new product-ranges to their portfolios. Saunders and 
Walter [1994], for example, found negative cost, economies of scope among the world’s 
200 largest banks – as the product range widens, unit-costs seem to go up, although 
not dramatically so. 
 However, the period covered by many of these studies involve firms that were 
shifting away from a pure focus on banking or insurance, and may thus have incurred 
considerable front-end costs in expanding the range of their activities. If these outlays 
were expensed in accounting statements during the period under study, then one might 
expect to see evidence of diseconomies of scope reversed in future periods. The 
evidence on cost-economies of scope so far remains inconclusive. 
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Operating Efficiencies 
 Besides economies of scale and cost-economies scope, financial firms of roughly 
the same size and providing roughly the same range of services can have very different 
cost levels per unit of output. There is ample evidence that such performance 
differences exist, for example, in comparisons of cost-to-income ratios among banks, 
insurance companies, and investment firms of comparable size. The reasons involve 
differences in production functions reflecting, efficiency and effectiveness in the use of 
labor and capital, sourcing and application of available technology, and acquisition of 
inputs, organizational design, compensation and incentive systems – i.e., in just plain 
better or worse management. These are what economists call X-efficiencies. 
 A number of studies have found rather large disparities in cost structures among 
banks of similar size, suggesting that the way banks are run is more important than their 
size or the selection of businesses that they pursue. [Berger, Hancock and Humphrey, 
1993; Berger, Hunter and Timme, 1993] The consensus of studies conducted in the 
United States seems to be that average unit costs in the banking industry lie some 20% 
above “best practice” firms producing the same range and volume of services, with most 
of the difference attributable to operating economies rather than differences in the cost 
of funds. [Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey, 1997] Siems [1996] found that the greater 
the overlap in branch networks, the higher the abnormal equity returns in U.S. bank 
mergers, while no such abnormal returns are associated with other factors like regional 
concentration ratios – suggesting that shareholder value gains in many of the US 
banking mergers of the 1990s were associated more with increases in  X-efficiency than 
with reductions in competition. If true, this is good news for smaller firms, since the 
quality of management seems to be far more important in driving costs than raw size or 
scope. Of course, if very large institutions are systematically better managed than 
smaller ones (which may be difficult to document in the real world of financial services) 
then there may be a link between firm size and X-efficiency.  
 It is also possible that very large organizations may be more capable of the 
massive and “lumpy” capital outlays required to install and maintain the most efficient 
information-technology and transactions-processing infrastructures. [Walter 2003] If 
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extremely high recurring technology spend-levels results in greater X-efficiency, then 
large financial services firms will tend to benefit in competition with smaller ones. 
Smaller firms will then have to rely on pooling and outsourcing, if feasible. 
In banking M&A studies, Berger and Humphrey [1992b] found that acquiring 
banks tend to be significantly more efficient than the acquired banks, suggesting that 
the acquirer may potentially improve the X-efficiency of the target. Akhavein, Berger, 
and Humphrey [1997] found mega-mergers between US banks increase returns by 
improving efficiency rather than increasing prices, suggesting also that acquiring banks 
use acquisitions as an occasion to improve efficiency within their own organizations. 
Houston and Ryngaert [1994] and DeLong [2001b] found that the market rewards 
mergers where geographic overlap exists between acquirer and target, presumably due 
to expected X-efficiency gains. 
 
Revenue Economies of Scope 
 On the revenue side, economies of scope attributable to cross-selling arise when 
the all-in cost to the buyer of multiple financial services from a single supplier is less 
than the cost of purchasing them from separate suppliers. This includes the cost of the 
services themselves plus information, search, monitoring, contracting and other costs. 
And firms that are diversified into several types of activities or several geographic areas 
in addition tend to have more contact points with clients. Revenue-diseconomies of 
scope could arise from management complexities and conflicts associated with greater 
breadth.  
 Some evidence on revenue economies of scope come from historical studies. 
Kroszner and Rajan [1994] found that U.S. bank affiliates typically underwrote better 
performing securities than specialized investment banks during the 1920s, when US 
commercial banks were permitted to have securities affiliates. Perhaps commercial 
banks obtained knowledge about firms contemplating selling securities through the 
deposit and borrowing history of the firm. If so, they could then select the best risks to 
bring to market. Likewise, Puri [1996] found that securities underwritten by commercial 
banks generated higher prices than similar securities underwritten by investment banks; 
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this suggests lower ex ante risk for those underwritten by commercial banks.   
 Most empirical studies of cross-selling are based on survey data, and are 
therefore difficult to generalize. Regarding wholesale commercial and investment 
banking services, for example, Exhibit 3 shows the results of a 2001 survey of corporate 
clients by Greenwich Research regarding the importance of revenue economies of 
scope between lending and M&A advisory services. The issue is whether companies 
are more likely to award M&A work to banks that are also willing lenders, or whether the 
two services are separable – so that companies go to the firms with the perceived best 
M&A capabilities (probably investment banking houses) for advice and to others 
(presumably the major commercial banks) for loans. The responses suggests that 
companies view these services as a single value-chain, so that banks that are willing to 
provide significant lending are also more likely to obtain M&A advisory work. Indeed, 
Exhibit 4 suggests that well over half of the major M&A firms (in terms of fees) in 2001 
were commercial banks with substantial lending power. This is sometimes called “mixed 
bundling,” meaning that the price of one service (e.g., commercial lending) is dependent 
on the client also taking another service (e.g., M&A advice or securities underwriting), 
although the search for immediate scope-driven revenue gains may have led to some 
disastrous lending by commercial banks in the energy and telecoms sectors in recent 
years.  
 However, it is at the retail level that the bulk of the revenue economies of scope 
are likely to materialize, since the search costs and contracting costs of retail customers 
are likely to be higher than for corporate customers. There is limited US evidence on 
retail cross-selling due to the regulatory restraints in place until 1999, and evidence from 
Europe, where universal banking and multifunctional financial conglomerates have 
always been part of the landscape, is mainly case-based and suggests highly variable 
outcomes as to the efficacy of bancassurance or Allfinanz. 
 In any case, the future may see some very different retail business models. One 
example is depicted in Exhibit 5. Here clients take advantage of user-friendly home 
interfaces to access Webservice platforms which allow real-time linkages to multiple 
financial services vendors. For the client, it could combine the “feel” of single-source 
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purchasing with access to best-in-class vendors – the client “cross-purchases” rather 
than being “cross-sold.” Absent the need for continuous financial advice, such a 
business model could reduce information costs, transactions costs and contracting 
costs while at the same time providing client-driven open-architecture access to the 
universe of competing vendors. Advice could be built into the model by suppliers who 
find a way to incorporate the advisory function into their downlinks, or  through 
independent financial advisers. If in the future such models of retail financial services 
delivery take hold in the market, then some of the rationale for cross-selling and 
revenue economies of scope could become obsolete. 
 Despite an almost total lack of hard empirical evidence, revenue economies of 
scope may indeed exist at both the wholesale and retail level. But they are likely to be 
very specific to the types of services provided and the types of clients served. So 
revenue-related scope economies are clearly linked to a firm’s specific strategic 
positioning across clients, products and geographies depicted in Exhibit 2. Even if 
cross-selling potential exists, the devil is in the details – mainly in the design of 
incentives and organizational structures to ensure that it actually occurs. And these 
incentives have to be extremely granular and compatible with employee real-world 
behavior. Without them, no amount of management pressure and exhortation to cross-
sell is likely to achieve its objectives. 
 Network economies associated with multifunctional financial firms may be 
considered a special type of demand-side economy of scope. [Economides, 1995] Like 
telecom-munications, relationships with end-users of financial services represent a 
network structure wherein additional client linkages add value to existing clients by 
increasing the feasibility or reducing the cost of accessing them. So-called “network 
externalities” tend to increase with the absolute size of the network itself. Every client 
link to the firm potentially “complements” every other one and potentially adds value 
through either one-way or two-way exchanges. The size of network benefits depends on 
technical compatibility and coordination in time and location, which universal banks and 
financial conglomerates may be in a position to provide. And networks tend to be self-
reinforcing in that they require a minimum critical mass and tend to grow in dominance 
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as they increase in size, thus precluding perfect competition in network-driven 
businesses. This characteristic may be evident in activities such as securities clearance 
and settlement, global custody, funds transfer and international cash management, and 
may to lock-in clients insofar as switching-costs tend to be relatively high. 
 What little empirical evidence there is suggests that revenue-economies of scope 
seem to exist for specific combinations of products in the realm of commercial and 
investment banking, as well as insurance and asset management. Empirical evidence 
concerning the existence of certain product-specific revenue economies of scope is 
beginning to materialize. For example, Yu [2001] showed that share prices of US 
financial conglomerates as well as specialists responded favorably when the Financial 
Services Modernization Act of 1999 was announced.  The study found that the market 
reacted most favorably for the shares of large securities firms, large insurance 
companies, and bank holding companies already engaged in some securities 
businesses (those with Section 20 subsidiaries allowing limited investment banking 
activities). The study suggested that the market expected gains from product 
diversification possibly arising from cross-product synergies. Another study by Lown et 
al. (2000) similarly found that both commercial and investment bank stocks rose on 
announcement by President Clinton on October 22, 1999 that passage of the Gramm 
Leach Bliley Act was imminent. 
 
Market Power 
 In addition to the strategic search for operating economies and revenue 
synergies, financial services firms will also seek to dominate markets in order to extract 
economic returns. This often referred to as economies of “size” as opposed to classic 
economies of “scale,” and can convey distinct competitive advantages that are reflected 
in either business volume or margins, or both. 
 Market power allows banks to charge more (monopoly benefits) or pay less 
(monopsony benefits). Indeed, many national markets for financial services have shown 
a distinct tendency towards oligopoly. Supporters argue that high levels of market 
concentration are necessary in order to provide a viable competitive platform. Without 
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convincing evidence of scale economies or other size-related efficiency gains, 
opponents argue that monopolistic market structures serve mainly to extract rents from 
consumers or users of financial services and redistribute them to shareholders, cross-
subsidize other areas of activity, invest in wasteful projects, or reduce pressures for 
cost-containment. 
Indeed, it is a puzzle why managers of financial services firms often seem to 
believe that the end-game in their industry’s competitive structure is the emergence of a 
few firms in gentlemanly competition with nice sustainable margins, whereas in the real 
world such an outcome can easily trigger public policy reaction leading to breaks-ups 
and spin-offs in order to restore more vigorous competition. Particularly in a critical 
economic sector that is easily politicized such as financial services, a regulatory 
response to “excessive” concentration is a virtual certainty despite sometimes furious 
lobbying to the contrary. In the case of Canada, for example, regulators prevented two 
megamergers in late 1998 that would have reduced the number of major financial firms 
from five to three with a retail market share of perhaps 90% between them.  Regulators 
blocked the deals despite arguments by management that major US financial services 
firms operating in Canada under the rules of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) would provide the necessary competitive pressure to prevent exploitation of 
monopoly power.  
Financial services market structures differ substantially as measured, for 
example, by the Herfindahl-Hirshman index. This metric of competitive structure is the 
sum of the squared market shares (H=∑s2), where 0<H<10,000 and market shares are 
measured for example, by deposits, by assets, or other indicators of market share. H 
rises as the number of competitor declines, and as market-share concentration 
increases among a given number of competitors. Empirically, higher values of H tend to 
be associated with higher degrees of pricing power, price-cost margins, and returns on 
equity across a broad range of industries. For example, despite very substantial 
consolidation in recent years within perhaps the most concentrated segment of the 
financial services industry, wholesale banking and capital markets activities, there is 
little evidence of market power. With some 80% of the combined value of global fixed-
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income and equity underwriting, loan syndications and M&A mandates captured by the 
top-ten firms, the Herfindahl-Hirshman index was still only 745 in 2001. This suggests a 
ruthlessly competitive market structure in most of these businesses, which is reflected in 
the returns to investors who own shares in the principal players in the industry – in fact, 
there has been a long-term erosion of return on capital invested in the wholesale 
banking industry. [Smith and Walter, 2003] 
 Another example is asset management, where the top firms comprise a mixture 
of European, American and Japanese asset managers and at the same time a mixture 
of banks, broker-dealers, independent fund management companies and insurance 
companies. Although market definitions clearly have to be drawn more precisely, at 
least on a global level asset management seems to be among the most contestable in 
the entire financial services industry, with a Herfindahl-Hirshman index of 540 among 
the top-40 firms in terms of assets under management.  And it shows very few signs of 
increasing concentration in recent years. 
 In short, although monopoly power created through mergers and acquisitions in 
the financial services industry can produce market conditions that allow firms to 
reallocate gains from clients to themselves, such conditions are not easy to achieve or 
to sustain. Sometimes new players – even relatively small entrants – penetrate the 
market and destroy oligopolistic pricing structures. Or there are good substitutes 
available from other types of financial services firms and consumers are willing to shop 
around. Vigorous competition (and low Herfindahl-Hirshman indexes) seems to be 
maintained even after intensive M&A activity in most cases as a consequence of 
relatively even distributions of market shares among the leading firms in many financial 
services businesses. 
Berger and Hannan [1996] found that loan rates were higher and deposit rates 
were lower when banks operated in concentrated markets. These increased revenues, 
however, did not result in higher profits – instead, the study showed evidence consistent 
with higher cost structures in such banks than their counterparts in less concentrated 
markets. Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey  [1997] found that banks which merge 
charge more for loans and pay less on deposits before they merge than other large 
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banks -- banks that merged charged 17 basis points more for loans than the average 
large bank prior to merging. After the merger, however, this difference fell to about 10 
basis points. This suggests that merging banks do not tend to take advantage of their 
increased market power. The authors contend that antitrust policy is effective in 
preventing mergers that would create market power problems. Siems [1996] reached a 
similar conclusion.  In a study of 19 bank megamergers (partners valued over $500 
million) in 1995, he rejected the market power hypothesis although he found that in-
market mergers create positive value for both the acquirer and the target upon 
announcement. There was no relationship between the resulting abnormal returns and 
the change in the Herfindahl-Hirshman index. Still, concentration seems to affect prices. 
Beatty, Santomero, and Smirlock [1987] found that the higher the market concentration 
of the banking industry in a given region, the higher the premium paid to acquire a bank 
in that area. 
 
Proprietary Information and Imbedded Human Capital  
 One argument in favor of large, diverse financial services industry is that internal 
information flows are substantially better and involve lower costs than external 
information flows in the market that are accessible by more narrowly focused firms. 
Consequently a firm that is present in a broad range of financial markets, functions and 
geographies can find proprietary and client-driven trading and structuring opportunities 
that smaller and more narrow firms cannot.  
 A second argument has to do with technical know-how. Significant areas of 
financial services – particularly wholesale banking and asset management – have 
become the realm of highly specialized expertise which can be reflected in both market 
share and price-effects. In recent years, large numbers of financial boutiques have been 
acquired by major banks, insurance companies, securities firms and asset managers for 
precisely this purpose, and anecdotal evidence suggests that in many cases these 
acquisitions have been shareholder-value enhancing for the buyer. 
 Closely aligned is the human capital argument. Technical skills and 
entrepreneurial behavior are embodied in people, and people can and do move. Parts 
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of the financial services industry have become notorious for the mobility of talent to the 
point of “free-agency,” and people or teams of people sometimes regard themselves as 
“firms within firms.” There are no empirical studies of these issues, although there is no 
question about their importance. Many financial services represent specialist 
businesses that are conducted by specialists meeting specialist client requirements. 
Knowhow embodied in people is clearly mobile, and the key is to provide a platform that 
is sufficiently incentive compatible to make the most of it. It seems unclear whether size 
or breadth has much to do with this. 
 
Diversification of Business Streams, Credit Quality and Financial Stability 
 Greater diversification of earnings attributable to multiple products, client-groups 
and geographies is often deemed to create more stable, safer, and ultimately more 
valuable financial institutions. The lower the correlations among the cash flows from the 
firm’s various activities, the greater the benefits of diversification. The consequences 
should include higher credit quality and higher debt ratings (lower bankruptcy risk), 
therefore lower costs of financing than those faced by narrower, more focused firms, 
while greater earnings stability should bolster stock prices. In combination, these effects 
should reduce the cost of capital and enhance profitability.  
 It has also been argued that shares of universal banks and financial 
conglomerates embody substantial franchise value due to their conglomerate nature 
and importance in national economies.  Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan [1996] 
suggest this guaranteed franchise value serves to inhibit extraordinary risk-taking. They 
find substantial evidence that the higher a bank’s franchise value, the more prudent 
management tends to be.  Such firms should therefore serve shareholder interests, as 
well as stability of the financial system – and the concerns of its regulators – with a 
strong focus on risk management, as opposed to financial firms with little to lose. This 
conclusion is, however, at variance with the observed, massive losses incurred by 
financial conglomerates universal banks in recent years in credit exposures to highly 
leveraged firms and special-purpose entities, real estate lending and emerging market 
transactions. 
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 Studies that test risk reduction often look at how hypothetical combinations could 
have reduced risk using actual industry data. In an early study, Santomero and Chung 
[1992] found that bank holding companies which existed from 1985 to 1989 could have 
reduced their probability of failure had they been permitted to diversify into insurance 
and securities. Of the ten combinations the authors examined, the best combination is 
the bank holding company linking to both insurance and securities firms.  The only 
combination that would have increased the probability of bankruptcy over a stand-alone 
bank holding company is one encompassing a large securities firm. Boyd, Graham, and 
Hewitt [1993] tested whether hypothetical mergers between bank holding companies 
and non-banking financial firms decrease risk. In their sample of data from 1971 to 
1987, they found that mergers between bank holding companies and insurance firms 
could have reduced risk while mergers between bank holding companies and securities 
firms or real estate firms could have increased risk. Saunders and Walter [1994] carried 
out a series of simulated mergers between US banks, securities firms and insurance 
companies in order to test the stability of earnings of the pro-forma “merged” firm as 
opposed to separate institutions. The opportunity-set of potential mergers between 
existing firms and the risk-characteristics of each possible combination were examined. 
The findings suggest that there are indeed potential risk-reduction gains from 
diversification in multi-activity financial services organizations, and that these increase 
with the number of activities undertaken. The main risk-reduction gains appear to arise 
from combining commercial banking with insurance activities, rather than with securities 
activities.   
 
Too Big to Fail Guarantees 
 Given the unacceptable systemic consequences of institutional collapse, large 
financial services firms that surpass a given threshold will be bailed-out by taxpayers. In 
the United States, this policy became explicit in 1984 when the Comptroller of the 
Currency testified to Congress that 11 banks were so important that they would not be 
permitted to fail. [O'Hara and Shaw, 1990] It was clearly present in the savings and loan 
collapses around that time. In other countries the same policy tends to exist, and seems 
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to cover even more of the local financial system. [US General Accounting Office, 1991] 
There were numerous examples in France, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and 
Japan during the1990s. Implicit too-big-to-fail (TBTF) guarantees create a potentially 
important public subsidy for major financial firms. 
 TBTF support was arguably extended to non-bank financial firms in the rescue of 
Long-term Capital Management, Inc. in 1998, brokered by the Federal Reserve (despite 
the fact that a credible private restructuring offer was on the table) on the basis that the 
firm’s failure could cause systemic damage to the global financial system. The same 
argument was made by JP Morgan in 1996 about the global copper market and one of 
its then-dominant traders, Sumitomo. Morgan suggested that collapse of the copper 
market could have serious systemic effects. The speed with which the central banks 
and regulatory authorities reacted to that crisis signaled the possibility of safety-net 
support of the copper market in light of major banks’ massive exposures in highly 
complex structured credits to the industry. And there were even mutterings of systemic 
effects in the collapse of Enron in 2001. Most of the time such arguments are self-
serving nonsense, but in a political environment under crisis conditions they could help 
throw a safety net sufficiently broad to limit damage to shareholders of exposed banks 
or other financial firms. 
 It is generally accepted that the larger the bank, the more likely it is to be covered 
under TBTF support. O'Hara and Shaw [1990] detailed the benefits of TBTF status: 
Without state assurances, uninsured depositors and other liability holders demand a risk 
premium. When a bank is not permitted to fail, the risk premium is no longer necessary.  
Furthermore, banks covered under the policy have an incentive to increase their risk in 
order to enjoy higher equity returns.  Kane [2000] investigated the possibility that large 
banks enjoy access to the TBTF guarantees in a study of merger-effects, although he 
did not distinguish between the stock market reaction to increased TBTF guarantees or 
the likelihood of increased profitability. He suggested further study to determine whether 
acquiring banks increase their leverage, uninsured liabilities, non-performing loans and 
other risk exposures, all of which would suggest that they are taking advantage of TBTF 
guarantees.  
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 One problem with the TBTF argument is to determine precisely when a financial 
institution becomes too big to fail.  Citicorp was already the largest bank holding 
company in the United States before it merged with Travelers in 1998.  Therefore, the 
TBTF argument may be a matter of degree. That is, the benefits of becoming larger 
may be marginal if a firm already enjoys TBTF status. 
 
Conflicts of Interest 
 The potential for conflicts of interest is endemic in all multifunctional financial 
services firms. [Saunders and Walter,1994] Classic conflict of interest arguments 
include the following: (1) When firms have the power to sell affiliates’ products, 
managers may no longer dispense "dispassionate" advice to clients and have a 
salesman's stake in pushing “house” products, possibly to the disadvantage of the 
customer; (2) A financial firm that is acting as an underwriter and is unable to place the 
securities in a public offering may seek limit losses by "stuffing" unwanted securities into 
accounts over which it has discretionary authority; (3) A bank with a loan outstanding to 
a client whose bankruptcy risk has increased, to the private knowledge of the banker, 
may have an incentive to encourage the borrower to issue bonds or equities to the 
general public, with the proceeds used to pay-down the bank loan;2 (4) In order to 
ensure that an underwriting goes well, a bank may make below-market loans to third-
party investors on condition that the proceeds are used to purchase securities 
underwritten by its securities unit; (5) A bank may use its lending power activities to 
encourage a client to also use its securities or securities services; and (6) By acting as a 
lender, a bank may become privy to certain material inside information about a 
customer or its rivals that can be used in setting prices, advising acquirers in a 
contested acquisition or helping in the distribution of securities offerings underwritten by 
its securities unit. [Smith and Walter, 1997A] More generally, a financial firm may use 
proprietary information regarding a client for internal management purposes which at 
                                                 
2 One example is the 1995 underwriting of a secondary equity issue of the Hafnia Insurance Group by Den Danske 
Bank. The stock was distributed heavily to retail investors, with proceeds allegedly used to pay-down bank loans 
even as Hafnia slid into bankruptcy [Smith and Walter, 1997B] The case came before the Danish courts in a 
successful individual investor litigation supported by the government 
  19 
the same time harms the interests of the client. 
 The potential for conflicts of interest can be depicted in a matrix such as Exhibit 
6. Many of the cells in the matrix represent various degrees and intensities of interest- 
conflicts. Some are serious and basically intractable. Others can be managed by 
appropriate changes in incentives or compliance initiatives. And some are not 
sufficiently serious to worry about. But using a matrix approach to mapping conflicts of 
interest demonstrates that the broader the client and product range, the more numerous 
are the potential conflicts and interest and the more difficult the task of keeping them 
under control -- and avoiding possibly large franchise losses. 
 Shareholders of financial firms have a vital stake in the management and control 
of conflicts of interest. They can benefit from conflict-exploitation in the short term, to the 
extent that business volumes and/or margins are higher as a result. And preventing 
conflicts of interest is an expensive business -- compliance systems are costly to 
maintain, and various types of walls between business units can have high opportunity 
costs because of inefficient use of information within the organization. On the other 
hand, costs associated with civil or criminal action and reputation losses due to conflicts 
of interest can weigh on shareholders very heavily indeed, as demonstrated by a variety 
of such problems in the financial services industry during 2000-2002. Some have 
argued that conflicts of interest may contribute to the price to book-value ratios of the 
shares of financial conglomerates and universal banks falling below those of more 
specialized financial services businesses. 
Conflicts of interest can also impede market performance. For example, inside 
information accessible to a bank as lender to a target firm would almost certainly 
prevent that bank from acting as an M&A adviser to a potential acquirer. Entrepreneurs 
may not want their private banking affairs handled by a bank that also controls their 
business financing. A mutual fund investor is unlikely to have easy access to the full 
menu of available equity funds though a financial conglomerate offering competing in-
house products. These issues may be manageable if most of the competition is coming 
from other financial conglomerates. But if the playing field is also populated by 
aggressive insurance companies, independent broker-dealers, fund managers and 
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other specialists, these issues tend to be a continuing strategic challenge for 
management (and a source of comfort for clients). 
 Should a major conflict of interest arise, the repercussions for a firm’s reputation 
can be quite detrimental.3 Recent well-reported examples include equity analyst 
conflicts of interest in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Analysts working for 
multifunctional financial firms wear several hats and are subject to multiple conflicts of 
interest. They are supposed to provide unbiased research to investors. But they are 
also expected to take part in the securities origination and sales process centered in 
their firms’ corporate finance departments. The firms argue that expensive research 
functions cannot be paid-for by attracting investor deal-flow and brokerage 
commissions, so that corporate finance has to cover much of the cost. This fact, and the 
astronomical compensation packages commanded by top analysts (occasionally 
exceeding $20 million per year) is the best demonstration of which of the two hats 
dominates. Prosecution of Merrill Lynch by the Attorney General of the State of New 
York in 2002, a $100 million settlement, and a frantic scramble by all securities firms to 
reorganize how equity research is organized and compensated simply validated facts 
long known to market participants.  
More broadly, both Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase in 2001 and 2002 were 
touched by just about every US corporate scandal that was revealed, often involving 
conflicts of interest, and both lost well over a third of their equity value in a matter of 
months (see Exhibit 7) no doubt in part as a consequence of conflicts of interest. 
  
Conglomerate Discount 
 It is often argued that the shares of multi-product firms and business 
conglomerates tend to trade at prices lower than shares of more narrowly-focused firms 
(all else equal). There are two basic reasons why this “conglomerate discount” is 
                                                 
3 For example, J.P. Morgan simultaneously served as commercial banker, investment banker, and 
adviser to Banco Español de Crédito (Banesto) in Spain, as well as being an equity holder and fund 
manager for co-investors in a limited partnership holding shares in the firm.  Additionally, Morgan’s Vice 
Chairman served on Banesto’s Supervisory Board. When Banesto failed and the conflicts of interest 
facing JP Morgan were revealed, the value of the firm’s equity fell by 10% – see Smith and Walter [1997]. 
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alleged to exist.  
First, it is argued that, on the whole, conglomerates tend to use capital 
inefficiently. It is argued that the potential benefits of diversification against the potential 
costs that include greater management discretion to engage in value-reducing projects, 
cross-subsidization of marginal or loss-making projects that drain resources from 
healthy businesses, misalignments in incentives between central and divisional 
managers, and the like. For a sample of U.S. corporations during the period 1986-91,  
Berger and Ofek [1995] demonstrated an average value-loss in multi-product firms on 
the order of 13-15%, as compared to the stand-alone values of the constituent 
businesses. The bulk of value-erosion in conglomerates was attributed by the authors to 
over-investment in marginally profitable activities and cross-subsidization. This value-
loss was smaller in cases where the multi-product firms were active in closely-allied 
activities within the same industrial sector. In other empirical work, John and Ofek 
[1995] showed that asset sales by corporations result in significantly improved 
shareholder returns on the remaining capital employed, both as a result of greater focus 
in the enterprise and value-gains through high prices paid by asset buyers. The 
evidence suggests that the internal capital market within conglomerates functions less 
efficiently than the external capital market. 
 Such empirical findings across broad ranges of industry may well apply to 
diverse activities carried out by financial firms as well. If retail banking and wholesale 
banking and P&C insurance are evolving into highly-specialized, performance-driven 
businesses, for example, one may ask whether the kinds of conglomerate discounts 
found in industrial firms may not also apply to financial conglomerate structures -- 
especially if centralized decision-making is becoming increasingly irrelevant to the 
requirements of the specific businesses.  
 A second possible source of a possible conglomerate discount is that investors in 
shares of conglomerates find it difficult to “take a view” and add pure sectoral exposures 
to their portfolios. Investors may want to avoid such stocks in their efforts to construct 
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efficient asset-allocation profiles. This is especially true of performance-driven 
managers of institutional equity portfolios who are under pressure to outperform cohorts 
or equity indexes. Why would a fund manager want to invest in yet another (closed-end) 
fund in the form of a conglomerate – one that may be active in retail banking, wholesale 
commercial banking, middle-market lending private banking, corporate finance, trading, 
investment banking, asset management insurance and perhaps other businesses as 
well? 
Both the capital-misallocation effect and the portfolio-selection effect may 
weaken investor demand for shares of universal banks and financial conglomerates, 
lower their equity prices, and produce a higher cost of capital than if the conglomerate 
discount were absent.  This higher cost of capital would have a bearing on the 
competitive performance and profitability of the enterprise. It may wholly or partially 
offset some of the aforementioned benefits of conglomeration, such as greater stability 
and lower bankruptcy risk through diversification across business lines. 
 
From Book Value of Equity to Market Value of Equity 
 From a shareholder perspective, all of the pluses and minuses of size and 














NPVf denotes the risk-adjusted discounted present value of a firm’s after-tax earnings, 
E(Rt) a represents the expected future revenues of the firm, E(Ct) represents expected 
future operating costs including charges to earnings for restructurings, loss provisions 
and taxes. The net expected returns in the numerator are then discounted to the 
present using a risk-free rate it and a composite risk adjustment α t  -- which captures 
the variance of expected net future returns resulting from credit risk, market risk, 
operational risk, and reputation risk, and at the same time captures the correlations 
between such risks associated with the firm’s various activities.  
Strategic initiatives in financial firms increase shareholder value if they generate: 
(1) Top-line gains which show up as increases in E(Rt) due for example to market-
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extension, increased market share, wider profit margins or successful cross-selling; (2) 
Bottom-line gains related to lower costs due to economies of scale or improved 
operating efficiency, -- reduced E(Ct) -- usually reflected in improved cost-to-income 
ratios, as well as better tax efficiency; or (3)  Reductions in risk associated with 
improved risk management or diversification of the firm across business streams, client 
segments or geographies whose revenue contributions are imperfectly correlated and 
therefore reduce the composite αt.  
This relationship can be depicted in a different way in Exhibit 8. The left-hand bar 
represents the adjusted book value of equity (ABVE). This starts with the book value of 
equity (BVE) – the sum of: (1) The par value of shares when originally issued; (2) The 
surplus paid-in by investors when the shares were issued; (3) Retained earnings on the 
books of the bank; and (4) Reserves set aside for loan losses. [Saunders, 2000] BVE 
must be written-up or written-down by unrealized capital gains or losses associated with 
the mark-to-market values of all balance sheet items. This calculation yields the 
adjusted book value of equity (ABVE). Its value may depart significantly from BVE for 
banks and insurance companies due to a general absence of market-value accounting 
across major categories of balance sheet items, although it may come pretty close for 
securities firms and asset managers.   
 After all balance sheet values have been taken into account and marked to 
market there may still be a material difference between ABVE and the actual market 
value of equity (MVE). This difference represents the market’s assessment of the 
present value of the risk-adjusted future net earnings stream, capturing all known or 
suspected business opportunities, costs and risks facing the firm and captured in the 
above equation – the “franchise value” of the firm. 
A simpler version is “Tobin’s Q,” defined as the ratio of the market value of a 
firm’s equity divided by a firm’s book value.  If the Q ratio is significantly below 1, for 
example, it may be that breaking-up the firm can serve the interests of shareholders if 
the book value of equity can be monetized. The Q ratio for well-run financial firms 
having a positive franchise value should normally be well in excess of 1, and is clearly 
susceptible to enhancement through managerial action.  
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 In Exhibit 8, each of the factors related to the size and breadth of financial 
services firms is identified in successive bars in the diagram – scale and scope effects, 
operating and tax efficiencies, stability and TBTF premiums, conglomerate discount, 
and the rest – in building to the value of equity observed in the market, MVE. The 
difference between book value or market-adjusted book value could be highly positive, 
as it has been in the case of AIG in the insurance sector, for example. Or it could be 
significantly negative, with the firm’s stock trading well below book value or even 
notional market-adjusted book value (its presumptive liquidation value). For example, in 
late September 2002 JP Morgan Chase stock was trading below book value, reflecting 
concerns of large exposures (especially in the telecoms sector) and questions about  
the bank’s strategy and its execution. 4 
 When strategic initiatives are undertaken, such as mergers or acquisitions, it is 
possible to add some empirical content to this kind of construct. In terms of US 
completed deals during a period of intense M&A activity in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
commercial bank acquisitions occurred at price-to-book value ratios of about 2.0, 
sometimes as high as 3.0 or even more. In eight of the eleven years covered by one 
study [Smith and Walter, 2000], the mean price-to-book ratio for US commercial 
banking acquisitions was below 2.0, averaging 1.5 and ranging from 1.1 in 1990 to 1.8 
in 1985. In two years, the price-to-book ratio exceeded 2.0 – in 1986 it was 2.8 and in 
1993 in was 3.2. These values presumably reflect the opportunity for the acquired 
institutions to be managed differently and to realize the incremental value needed to 
reimburse the shareholders of the acquiring institutions for the willingness to pay the 
premium in the first place. If in fact the potential to capture value for multifunctional 
financial firms exceeds that for the traditional US-type separated commercial banks 
reflected in such studies, this should be reflected in higher merger premiums outside the 
United States as well as within the US after the 1999 liberalization of line-of-business 
restrictions. 
                                                 
4 “Strategy Worries Hit JP Morgan Share Price,” Financial Times, 19 September 2002. 
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 Event study methodology [Brown and Warner, 1985] can also be used to 
determine investor reaction to events such as the announcement of a presumably 
value-enhancing merger that adds either size or scope. The technique controls for 
conditions in the general market and tries determine the relationship that a particular 
stock has with the market under “normal” conditions -- that is, before the event occurs. 
This relationship can be established by regressing the returns of the stock on the 
market index and a constant.5 One then determines what the stock “should” have 
earned (total return) given the state of the general market as well as the stock’s past 
relationship with that market. These hypothetical returns are compared with actual 
returns to determine the abnormal returns -- that is, how much more or less the stock 
actually earns as a result of the announcement.6 
 Abnormal returns are added together over various time periods, usually several 
days before the announcement to several days after. One needs to look at a few days 
before the event in case any news about the event has leaked and affected the value of 
the stock.  Looking at the abnormal returns for a few days after the announcement 
allows one to take “second thoughts” into account. The market may be so surprised by 
an announcement that the market may need a few days to digest the news.  One 
cannot know for sure the ideal length of the pre- or post-event periods.  Extending either 
period leads to problems, since other events such as earnings reports or changes in 
management could have occurred and the market could be reacting to them instead of 
the one being examined.   
                                                 
5We obtain the following relationship: ai + biRMt, where RMt = the return on the market at time t; "i = 
egression result on the constant; $i = relationship between the market and stock i, also known as the beta 
of stock i. 
6That is,  ARit = Rit - ("i + $iRMt), where  ARit = abnormal return for stock i at time t; Rit = return on stock 
i at time t; and RMt = the return on the market at time t. 
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 As an example of how the event study approach can be used, we applied it to the 
seven strategic M&A deals undertaken by UBS AG and its predecessor organizations 
during the period 1992-2000.  These include the Swiss Bank Corporation acquisition of 
O'Connor (9 January 1992), the SBC acquisition of Brinson (31 August 1994), the SBC 
acquisition of S.G. Warburg (2 May 1995), the SBC takeover of Dillon Read (15 May 
1997), the merger of Swiss Bank Corporation and Union Bank of Switzerland to form 
the present UBS AG (8 December 1997), the UBS acquisition of Global Asset 
Management (GAM) announced in 13 September 1999, and the UBS acquisition of 
PaineWebber announced on 11 July 2000. The first four deals were undertaken by 
Swiss Bank Corporation, and can therefore be viewed in terms of SBC share price 
impacts, the SBC-UBS merger in 1997 can be examined in terms of both SBC and UBS 
cumulative abnormal returns, while the GAM and PaineWebber deals would have 
affected the shares of the new UBS AG. 
 We estimated alpha and beta using daily returns from 500 to 10 days before the 
merger announcement by regressing the returns of the stock on the returns of the Swiss 
SMI index. To determine the extent to which a particular merger was perceived by the 
market to have created or destroyed value, we cumulated the abnormal returns for 
various event windows for each SBC and UBS transaction beginning with O’Connor in 
1992 and ending with PaineWebber in 2000. As mentioned above, no scientific way of 
determining the ideal event window exists. No confounding events (earnings reports, 
changes in management, other major mergers) occurred around the time of the merger 
announcements. We therefore conclude that the market was reacting only to the 
announcement of the particular merger. The respective calculated abnormal returns are 
as follows: 
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No regularity is obvious from the market’s reactions to SBC or UBS merger or 
acquisition announcements based on the seven cases examined here.  That is, the 
market appears to judge each merger on its own merits.  Market reaction to the merger 
of UBS and SBC, for example, was highly positive for shareholders of both firms, 
possibly reflecting costs cuts (especially in the domestic banking business) that could 
be made possible by the merger together with the presumably stronger competitive 
position of the new UBS AG in its various lines of activity, notably private banking and 
investment banking. This in line with earlier event study research such as DeLong 
[2001b] and Houston, James and Ryngaert [1999] who find that in-market (focusing) 
mergers tend to create value upon announcement based on the US financial services 
deal-flow -- targets of in-market mergers gain and acquirers do not lose. On the other 
hand, market reaction to the UBS acquisition of PaineWebber was strongly negative, 
probably in large part due to the high price paid. 
 
Conclusions 
 Assessing the potential effects of size and scope in financial services firms is as 
straightforward in concept as it is difficult to calibrate in practice. The positives include 
economies of scale, improvements in operating efficiency (including the impact of 
technology), cost economies of scope, revenue economies of scope, impact on market 
structure and pricing power, improved financial stability through diversification of 
revenue streams, improvements in the attraction and retention of human capital, and 
possibly TBTF support. The negatives include diseconomies of scale, higher operating 
costs due to increased size and complexity, diseconomies of scope on either the cost or 
Abnormal Returns for Acquiror
Merger Date Event Date [-1,+1] window [-3,+3] window [-5,+5] window
SBC O'Connor 9-Jan-92 0.444% 0.930% -2.587% 0.902%
SBC Brinson 31-Aug-94 -0.713% 1.084% -3.704% -5.205%
SBC Warburg 2-May-95 -0.012% -2.515% -5.170% -7.127%
SBC Dillon Read 15-May-97 -0.413% -1.551% -1.842% 5.231%
SBC-UBS (for SBC) 8-Dec-97 4.108% 7.756% 5.929% 4.936%
SBC-UBS (for UBS) 8-Dec-97 9.368% 13.133% 12.813% 10.256%
UBS-GAM 13-Sep-99 -0.082% 0.977% 1.452% -0.899%
UBS-PaineWebber 11-Jul-00 -0.244% -7.306% -2.795% -3.509%
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revenue sides (or both), the impact of possible conflicts of interest on the franchise 
value of the firm, and a possible conglomerate discount in the share price. Bigger and 
broader is sometimes better, sometimes not. It all depends. 
The evidence so far suggests rather limited prospects for firm-wide cost 
economies of scale and scope among major financial services firms in terms of overall 
cost structures, although they certainly exist in specific lines of activity. Operating 
economies (X-efficiency) seems to be the principal determinant of observed differences 
in cost levels among banks and nonbank financial institutions. Revenue-economies of 
scope through cross-selling may well exist, but they are likely to apply very differently to 
specific client segments and product lines. Conflicts of interest can pose major risks for 
shareholders of multifunctional financial firms, which may materialize in civil or even 
criminal litigation and losses in franchise value, There is plenty of evidence that 
diversification across uncorrelated business streams promotes stability, although 
unexpected correlation spikes (as between insurance and investment banking) may 
arise from time to time. 
Exhibit 9 shows the most valuable financial services in the North America and 
Europe in terms of market capitalization. Two observations could be made. First, the 
largest by whatever measures are used in the major industry segments are not 
necessarily the most valuable. Indeed, rank correlations between size and market value 
are low. And second, both lists are highly diverse. Generalists and specialists co-
habitate at the top of the financial services league tables in both regions of the world. 
Both observations suggest that the key is in “how” things are done rather than “what” is 
done. While the burden of proof tends fall on bigger and broader firms, a few cases like 
GE Capital Services (a conglomerate within a conglomerate) shows that specialist 
businesses run by specialists on a highly-rated capital platform -- subject to unrelenting 
pressure to sweat the equity by a demanding corporate owner insisting on market 
dominance together with benchmark attention of service quality, cost control and risk 
control, shows that it can be done and that it can be done on a sustained basis. 
Although even here the issue of transparency eventually forced a breakup of GE 
Capital’s organizational structure in 2002. 
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In a way, the absence of clear signs of “strategic dominance” – generalists 
gaining the upper hand over specialists or the other way round – is encouraging. Any 
number can play, and there are no magic formulas.  The devil remains in the details, 
and there is a premium on plain old good management. From a systemic perspective as 
well, diversity in the financial system is probably a good thing, as firms competing 
across strategic groups as well as within them put a premium on both efficiency in 
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Wholesale banking volume comprises  loan syndications (full credit to lead manager, debt and equity underwriting (full credit to bookrunner,
Medium-term notes (full credit to dealer) and M&A advisories (full credit to lead adviser). Data: Thomson Financial Securities Data Platinum.
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THE 15 MOST VALUABLE FINANCIAL SERVICES BUSINESSES IN NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE 1
(market capitalization in US $ million, July 2002)
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1 Source: Business Week, July 15, 2002
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